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INTRODUCTION
All too often the options facing the United States (as well as other
nations) when it comes to foreign affairs are portrayed as a binary
choice between unilateralism and multilateralism, between “bowling
alone” and playing with others. 1 Framing the choice this way packs a
* Hamilton Fish Professor of Law & Diplomacy, Columbia Law School. This
is the text of remarks delivered at the American University Washington College of
Law in September 2008. I am grateful for comments received from Michael Doyle.
1. See generally UNILATERALISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES (David M. Malone & Yuen Foong Khong eds., 2003) (exploring the
effects of the Bush Administration foreign policy of unilateralism); cf. ROBERT D.
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
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rhetorically powerful punch—as when former President Bill Clinton
suggested at the 2008 Democratic Convention that the might of the
United States rests not on its demonstrable military power but on the
power of its example (including presumably its adherence to the
international rule of law). 2 The suggestion that committing to
international law requires ceding the deployment of one’s unilateral
power in deference to others—that it requires ceding to multilateral
consent and involves a choice between relying on brute force and
relying on the rule of law—also haunts international law scholarship.
Today’s legal academy, particularly in the United States, reflects a
divide between traditional defenders of international legalism and
revisionist upstarts who question the efficacy, or at the very least the
democratic legitimacy, of both global treaties negotiated within
multilateral institutions and the rules of custom that are backed by
the international community. 3 It is easy to see this academic chasm,
which has obviously been reflected in the policies adopted by the
outgoing Bush Administration, as a schism between those who
believe in international law and those who do not. At the extreme
end one finds John Bolton, former U.S. ambassador to the United
Nations, who famously contended that international law does not
really exist. Bolton stated that while nations might be said to be
“politically” or “morally” bound to adhere to those international
agreements to which they have given their consent, they cannot be
said to be “legally” bound by them because the only real law is
national law sanctioned by a national constitution such as the United
States’ Constitution. 4 For Bolton, who removed the United States’
signature from the International Criminal Court’s Statute in the early
COMMUNITY (2000) (exploring evidence of declining community participation and
social interactions by Americans and its impact on the country).
2. See Transcript: Bill Clinton’s Convention Speech, NEW YORK TIMES, Aug.
27, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/27/us/politics/27text-clinton.html
(“People the world over have always been more impressed by the power of our
example than by the example of our power.”).
3. For a survey of scholarly views, see José E. Alvarez, The Closing of the
American Mind, in RECONCILING LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLITICS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL ARENA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 32ND ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE
CANADIAN COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, OTTAWA, OCTOBER 16-18, 2003
74, 85-86 (John McManus ed., 2004); see also James C. Hathaway, America,
Defender of Democratic Legitimacy?, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 122 (2000)
(criticizing the United States’ tendency to act unilaterally).
4. John R. Bolton, Is There Really “Law” in International Affairs?, 10
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 48 (2000).
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days of the current Bush Administration, 5 the battle against
international legalization is about nothing less than protecting the
United States’ rule of law from encroachment by ersatz multilateral
rules.
The view that commitment to international law reflects a binary
on/off switch is not limited to this side of the Atlantic. Particularly
since the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003, European legal
scholars have sometimes portrayed the United States as a renegade
nation bent on defying global norms and threatening to create a
“lawless world,” whether with respect to the environment,
international criminal law, humanitarian law, or human rights. 6 To
European critics such as British international lawyer Philippe Sands,
adherence to international law requires a commitment to multilateral
action over unilateral action. 7 At a conference on unilateralism held
just prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, the
fundamental divide between the academics present was becoming
evident. The Europeans (but very few of the Americans) identified
the legal “obligation to cooperate” as the basis for the post-world war
international legal order. 8 For Europeans like Pierre-Marie Dupuy,
the presumption deployed in the Lotus Case—the right of a state to
act alone—has come to be severely conditioned; it has been
displaced by a “law of coexistence” that, in general, requires states to
exhaust multilateral remedies before they can legitimately turn to
unilateral action. 9
This dichotomous perspective has considerable evidence to
support it. Particularly in recent years, the United States has often
tried to “go it alone,” at the expense of a sincere or credible

5. JOHN BOLTON, SURRENDER IS NOT AN OPTION: DEFENDING AMERICA AT
UNITED NATIONS AND ABROAD 85 (2007) (calling his “unsigning” of the
Rome Statute on behalf of the Bush Administration his “happiest moment at
State”).
6. See, e.g., PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD: AMERICAN AND THE MAKING
AND BREAKING OF GLOBAL RULES FROM FDR’S ATLANTIC CHARTER TO GEORGE
W. BUSH’S ILLEGAL WAR (2005) (discussing U.S. unilateral policies in violation of
international law).
7. Cf. id. at 174-80 (Criticizing unilateral “anticipatory self-defense”).
8. See, e.g., Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Place and Role of Unilateralism in
Contemporary International Law, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 19 (2000) (describing the
divergent views of the United States on the role of unilateralism in foreign policy).
9. Id. at 23-24.
THE
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commitment to engage in multilateral negotiations.10 The most
famous example of U.S. unilateralism or exceptionalism is the “Bush
Doctrine,” that former Vice Presidential candidate Sarah Palin had
some trouble identifying in some of her televised interviews. 11 The
Bush Doctrine is the proposition, proclaimed in the U.S. National
Security Strategy, that the United States can deploy the “preemptive” use of force in response to potential threats to its security,
even if these threats are uncertain in scope and would not have
otherwise triggered anticipatory self-defense under customary
international law. 12 This strained effort to re-interpret the terms of
the U.N. Charter’s ban on the use of military force is not the only
recent black mark on the United States’ international law record. 13
The United States has also pointedly rejected participation in
multilateral treaty negotiations on a number of fronts over recent
years. We have frequently pursued a strategy of acting alone and
refused to join prominent multilateral treaty regimes—including
arms control agreements (such as the Comprehensive Test Ban), the
Kyoto protocol, the Statute of the International Criminal Court
(ICC), the Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Convention on
Biological Diversity, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and
on their Destruction, numerous International Labor Organizations
agreements, and global human rights treaties such as the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(“CEDAW”), the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
and protocol one of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. 14 Many international lawyers, including non-European
10. See David D. Caron, Between Empire and Community: The United States
and Multilateralism 2001-2003: A Mid-Term Assessment, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
395 (2003) (describing the U.S. trend towards unilateralism during the
administration of George W. Bush).
11. Excerpts: Charlie Gibson Interviews Sarah Palin, ABC NEWS, Sept. 11,
2008, http://abcnews.go.com/politics/vote2008/story?id=5782924&page=1. See
also Harold Hongju Koh, Foreword: On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1479, 1497-1501 (2003) (discussing the Bush Doctrine).
12. THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 15-16 (2002), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/
nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf (delineating the Bush Administration’s security policies,
including preemptive action against emerging threats to the United States).
13. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
14. See generally UNILATERALISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 1.
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lawyers, have echoed the critiques of scholars like Philippe Sands. 15
Many of us have also pointed out that the United States’ war on
international law has also taken the form of lawless interpretations of
some of the treaty regimes to which we belong, including the 1949
Geneva Conventions and the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 16 Even our
own Supreme Court has suggested that we have severely mangled
international law, particularly in the course of waging our “war”
against terror. 17 But this view of the plight of contemporary
international law—and the challenges it faces from states such as the
United States—over-simplifies the choices countries such as the
United States face.
We need to be careful about overstating the case against United
States unilateralism, not only because of the risk of partisan political
backlash, but more importantly because the next president cannot
afford to take such a simple view of the choices this nation and the
world face. The next administration will necessarily have to engage
far more than the Bush Administration ever did with international
law and its institutions. As it does so, it will increasingly find legal
regimes that are too complex to be reduced to a simple choice
between unilateralism and multilateralism or the deployment of
power versus subservience to law. Contemporary international legal
regimes are not principally about choosing between acting as lawless
empire or pre-committing oneself to multilateral cooperation.

I. THE IDEAL OF LAW
What we increasingly find—in regimes as distinct as those seeking
to prevent terrorist acts and those governing foreign investment—is a
turn to what I would call an empire of law. This is not the same as
either the ideal of the rule of law as portrayed by idealistic
15. See, e.g., CLYDE PRESTOWITZ, ROGUE NATION: AMERICAN
UNILATERALISM AND THE FAILURE OF GOOD INTENTIONS (2003) (criticizing U.S.
unilateralism and advocating multilateral approaches to confront terrorism and
other world problems).
16. See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.
175 (2006) (critiquing Bush Administration lawyers’ memoranda justifying
“enhanced interrogation techniques”).
17. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 628-33 (2006) (holding that trials
before specially designed military commission violate both U.S. and international
law).
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international lawyers or the exercise of hegemonic rule by one
particular national empire, that is, what some might call the law of
empire. Nor is it the case that today’s empires of law involve only
multilateral institutions such as the United Nations.

A. THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS
For all the attention and proper criticism of the United States’
defiance of the international community and the strictures of the
U.N. Charter in choosing to invade Iraq, it is important to recognize
just how much even the Bush Administration continued to rely on
international law and the United Nations in waging its “war” on
terror and weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, even with respect to
the invasion of Iraq, the lawyers of the U.S. State Department have
preferred not to rely on the controversial notion of the pre-emptive
use of force. 18 Their case for the legality of that invasion has not
relied primarily on the Bush Doctrine. The government lawyers
charged with justifying that invasion have emphasized instead that
U.S. actions were justified because U.N. Security Council authorized
the collective use of force against Iraq twelve years earlier in
Resolution 687. Furthermore, they have noted that Security Council
members had acquiesced in later U.S. and U.K. military actions to
enforce the U.N.-authorized “no fly” zones over Iraq. 19 Whether or
not one accepts the contention that the invasion of Iraq was merely
another step in enforcing the U.N. Security Council’s own terms for
continuing to deal with a threat to the international peace, these
arguments by Bush Administration lawyers highlight the fact that
even after 9/11, Philippe Sands’ “lawless” nation has repeatedly
turned to the U.N. Security Council and its Chapter VII enforcement
powers with respect to issues regarding the international law of selfdefense, counter-terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and the
occupation of Iraq. 20
18. See, e.g., William H. Taft IV & Todd F. Buchwald, Agora: Future
Implications of the Iraq Conflict, Preemption, Iraq, and International Law, 97 AM.
J. INT’L L. 557 (2003) (supporting the United States’ use of military force in Iraq
largely on the basis of prior Security Council resolutions).
19. Id. at 559.
20. See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, Editorial Comment, Hegemonic International
Law Revisited, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 873 (2003) (surveying the normative effects of
Security Council actions concerning counterterrorism, postconflict Iraq, and selfdefense against the Taliban).
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Though today few international lawyers accept the unilateralist
doctrine of the pre-emptive use of force, far more are willing to
accept the proposition that the rules governing self defense have been
subtly changed by the preambles of Security Council Resolutions
1368 and 1373 and states’ acquiescence in U.S. actions in
Afghanistan after 9/11. 21 These resolutions imply that:
(1) Terrorist violence, at least when of the scale of the events
of September 11, 2001, and even when undertaken by a
nonstate actor, may constitute an “armed attack” for purposes
of U.N. Charter Article 51.
(2) A state’s assistance to, harboring of, or post hoc
ratification of violent acts undertaken by individuals within
its territory, or perhaps even mere negligence in controlling
such individuals, may make that state responsible for those
acts and justify military action against it. In other words, such
state action (or inaction) may constitute a breach of the state’s
own duty not to violate U.N. Charter Article 2(4).
(3) The right to respond with military force against both
terrorist individuals and harboring states does not become
impermissible retaliation or illegal anticipatory self-defense,
or exceed the rules of proportionality, merely because the
threat of continued terrorist attack remains clandestine and
unpredictable (as it has been since 9/11). 22
The United States, in short, has turned to the United Nations just
like critics such as Sands would recommend—at least to secure
multilateral acceptance of its numerous military actions apart from
those in Iraq. 23 It has used international law to justify, and to modify,
the rules permitting force.
Further, as its legalist critics have urged, the United States has
turned to the U.N. Security Council to legalize its efforts to
criminalize terrorist acts around the world. The U.N. Security
Council’s law-enforcement efforts to counter terrorism have
accompanied the United States’ military “war” on terror. 24 The

21. S.C. Res 1368, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C. Res.
1373, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
22. Alvarez, supra note 20, at 879.
23. See Richard N. Gardner, Agora: Future Implication of the Iraq Conflict,
Neither Bush Nor the “Jurisprudes”, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 585, 589 (2003).
24. See Alvarez, supra note 20, at 874-78 (describing the Security Council’s
efforts).

818

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[24:811

United States has spearheaded these efforts, but they have been
pursued under the flag of the United Nations. After 9/11 the U.N.
Security Council has expanded its efforts to impose “smart
sanctions” against named terrorists and terrorist organizations. 25 The
Council’s resolutions, subsequent to its original Resolution 1267 that
first imposed sanctions on persons identified by the Council as
members of or contributors to Al Queda, created procedures by
which hundreds of individuals or organizations believed to be
associated with Al Queda or the Taliban anywhere in the world have
been denied access to their bank accounts or the right to travel
overseas. 26 Today, a Security Council Sanctions Committee
implements sanctions similar to those imposed by the U.S. Office of
Foreign Assets Control, except that the authority for these is not U.S.
law but the law of the U.N. Charter, specifically the power of
Council under Chapter VII to undertake enforcement action and to
do so even if such action would otherwise violate international law. 27
Under resolution 1373 the Council has effectively legislated
portions of the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism. 28 In that resolution, the Security Council
mandated, among other things, that all states must criminalize
provision of funding to be used for terrorist acts, freeze assets of
parties who use those assets to commit acts of terrorism, and prohibit
transfer of terrorist funding. Further, it decided that states must not
harbor terrorists or those who finance terrorists. must implement
border controls to prevent migration of terrorist groups, and
cooperate with one another during investigations of terrorist
activity. 29 Resolution 1373 and its progeny, which established the
U.N. counter-terrorism committee (“CTC”) to oversee these efforts

25. See id.
26. See Eric Rosand, Current Developments, The Security Council’s Efforts to
Monitor the Implementation of Al Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 745
(2004) (examining the implementation of sanctions against suspected Al Qaeda
and Taliban members).
27. See Financial War on Terrorism: New Money Trails Present Fresh
Challenges: Hearing Before the Comm. on Finance, 107th Cong., S. Hrg. 107-880,
at 42-47 (2002), available at http://www.senate.gov/~finance/hearings/84922.pdf
(prepared statement of Alan Larson, Under Secretary of State for Economic,
Business and Agricultural Affairs) (presenting an overview of the U.S. sanctions
and listing procedures targeted at terrorist finance).
28. See Alvarez, supra note 20, at 875.
29. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 21, ¶1-2.
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and provide states with assistance in implementing the Council’s
legislative demands, is an attempt to establish a fairly comprehensive
counter-terrorism regime. 30 The United States’ role in driving these
actions was quite evident. As some U.S. officials suggested, the
Security Council’s efforts appeared to be an attempt to make
effective at the global level the strictures imposed under the USA
PATRIOT Act and related U.S. counterterrorism legislation. 31
The United States has also turned to the U.N. Security Council for
help in stemming the threats posed to the world by weapons of mass
destruction. Under Resolution 1540, the Council established a regime
comparable to that established under 1373 for counter-terrorism. 32
Under that resolution, the Council, again acting under Chapter VII of
the U.N. Charter, prohibited all states from providing any support to
non-state actors that attempt to develop, acquire or transport nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapons. 33 The Council also required states
to adopt and enforce appropriate laws to advance this aim and to
enforce measures to establish domestic controls over such
weapons. 34 The Council also established, as it with respect to
counter-terrorism, a separate committee to provide States with
assistance in complying with these edicts and to receive state reports
indicating how states are complying. 35
It would also be inaccurate to portray the United States’
occupation of Iraq since the war as a unilateral throwback to the days
of unfettered imperialism. The occupation of Iraq was not untethered
from international law but was, on the contrary, a product of its
application. Although the Security Council has avoided suggesting
that the United States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq was legal, the Council
has affirmed the responsibilities of Iraq’s occupiers through
resolutions 1483 and its progeny. 36 The United Nations, through the
Council, has continued to bless the agreements between Iraqi

30. See Eric Rosand, Current Developments, Security Council Resolution 1373,
the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight Against Terrorism, 97 AM. J.
INT’L L. 333, 334-35 (2003) (describing the creation of the CTC and how it
functions).
31. See Alvarez, supra note 20, at 875.
32. S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
33. Id. ¶ 1.
34. Id. ¶¶ 2-3.
35. Id. ¶ 4.
36. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 20, at 882-86.
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authorities and the United States authorizing continued occupation
by the latter. 37 It has also legitimated joint U.S.-Iraqi efforts to
impose criminal liability on Iraq’s former leaders. 38 While the
convictions and subsequent executions of Iraqi leaders such as
Saddam Hussein, undertaken without the involvement of the
International Criminal Court, have drawn their share of critics, it
would not be accurate to display such efforts as entirely unauthorized
by the United Nations. 39 In addition, while U.S. efforts to impose
“democracy” on Iraq have also invoked comparisons to an
“imperial” age long since passed, even these can be connected to
Council authority. At least during the period prior to installation of
an Iraqi government, the Security Council also gave the United
States and the United Kingdom, as occupying powers, implicit
permission to reform Iraqi institutions to the extent necessary to
bring about democratic institutions. 40 As some commentators have
suggested, in doing these things the Council may have subtly
changed the underlying rules of occupation law, under which
occupiers have been required to be mere caretakers not authorized to
engage in comprehensive or permanent reforms of the occupied
country’s institutions. 41
It would be relatively easy to praise all of the Council’s efforts as
the counterpoint to the Bush Administration’s unilateral “war” on
terror. One could portray all of these as antidotes to the Bush
Administration’s “lawless” attempts to threaten force preemptively,
to detain “enemy combatants” without notifying the Red Cross, or to
question detainees through unlawful “enhanced interrogation
techniques.” 42 It is not hard to describe these Council resolutions as

37. S.C. Res. 1483, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003); see also David
J. Scheffer, Agora (Continued): Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict, Beyond
Occupation Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 842 (2003) (describing the U.N. Security
Council’s actions allowing the U.S. and U.K. to occupy and govern Iraq).
38. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 37, pmbl., ¶ 3.
39. Cf. José E. Alvarez, Trying Hussein: Between Hubris and Hegemony, 2 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 319 (2004) (surveying criticisms of the Iraqi Criminal Tribunal
established in the wake of U.S. occupation).
40. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 37, pmbl., ¶ 4 and ¶ 8.
41. See, e.g., Scheffer, supra note 37, at 844-45.
42. See Scott Shane, David Johnston, & James Risen, Secret U.S. Endorsement
of Severe Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2007, at A1 (reporting that U.S.
Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez approved the harsh interrogation techniques
despite criticism).
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attempts to use the U.N. Charter’s collective security arm as
intended, no less so than the Council resolutions leading to the first
invasion of Iraq, namely the first President Bush’s Gulf War. 43 That
earlier Council effort has been widely praised in the scholarly
literature as an exemplar of the U.N. Charter working as the
collective security mechanism that it was intended to be. 44 Like
Resolution 678, which authorized the use of force by those acting to
defend Kuwait, the Council’s efforts in Resolutions 1373, 1540,
1267, and 1428 are no less products of the rule of law. They too are
Chapter VII actions duly authorized by the Charter. They too are the
products of the Council’s ability to proclaim a “threat to the peace”
as it sees fit (pursuant to article 39 of the U.N. Charter) and the
authority under the Charter enabling the Council to take any and all
measures (including actions that impact directly on individuals)
under articles 41 and 42 of the U.N. Charter.45 Further, the Council is
specifically authorized under article 103 of the Charter to override
members’ existing treaty obligations as necessary to implement its
collective enforcement sanctions. 46 Thus, the Council’s actions seem
to be the embodiment of the international rule of law and the United
Nations working as intended: an explicit abdication by the “hyperpower” of the temptation to exert its considerable powers extralegally.

B. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT TREATIES
The United States’ turn to international investment treaties is
another progressive example of the United States’ turn to legalism
over the sheer deployment of power. In the days of formal empire,
the United States, like other colonial powers, sometimes threatened
“gunboat diplomacy” to defend the rights of its private foreign

43. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990); S.C. Res. 687, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991).
44. See generally Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, Agora: The Gulf Crisis in
International and Foreign Relations Law, U.N. Police Action in Lieu of War: “The
Old Order Changeth”, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 63, 63 (1991).
45. See U.N. Charter arts. 39, 41, 42; see generally Paul C. Szasz, Notes and
Comments, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 901, 901
(2002).
46. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 748, ¶ 17-8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (Mar. 31, 1992)
(imposing aviation sanctions on Libya notwithstanding pre-existing treaties
guaranteeing Libya landing rights).
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investors overseas. 47 Today, U.S. foreign investors are more likely to
be protected by international investment treaties and not by lawless
threats, nor even by the United States threatening to apply unilateral
economic sanctions against an expropriating state (as under the
United States’ Hickenlooper Amendment). 48 U.S. and other foreign
investors today are protected by an intricate web of nearly 3,000
bilateral or regional investment protection treaties. 49 These treaties
generally contain assurances that once admitted, foreign investors:
(1) will receive trade treatment equal to that which the host state
gives to any other foreign investor (“most favored nation” status) or
the treatment it accords its own investors (national treatment);
(2) will receive “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection
and security” in accordance with international law; (3) will be able to
transfer profits and other capital out of the country without
unreasonable currency restrictions; and 4) will receive prompt,
adequate and fair compensation if expropriated directly or
indirectly. 50 Many investment agreements also provide that foreign
investors from either state party will be able to forego local courts
and have direct access to international binding arbitration to resolve
alleged treaty violations by host states. 51 This means that unlike most
international legal regimes, the investment regime grants its non-

47. See Ray C. Jones, NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-to-State Dispute
Resolution: A Shield to Be Embraced or a Sword to Be Feared?, 2002 BYU L.
REV. 527, 529-31 (2002).
48. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370 (West 2004). The Hickenlooper Amendment cuts
off U.S. foreign assistance to countries that expropriate the property of U.S.
citizens. See generally ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
473 (2002) (marking the explosion of U.S. bilateral investment treaties over recent
years).
49. See, e.g., Lisa Sachs & Karl Sauvant, BITs, DITs and FDI Flows: An
Overview, in THE IMPACT OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND DOUBLE
TAXATION TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FLOWS (Jeffrey Sachs ed.,
2009); José E. Alvarez, The Evolving Foreign Investment Regime, IL.POST, Feb.
29, 2008, http://www.asil.org/ilpost/president/ pres080229.html (stating that nearly
every member of these treaties has some obligation to give foreign investors most
favored nation treatment and to protect investors from harms caused by investment
contract breaches or customary international law).
50. R. DOAK BISHOP, JAMES CRAWFORD, & W. MICHAEL REISMAN, FOREIGN
INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 1007-1169 (2005)
(considering arbitral caselaw interpreting these rights).
51. See id. at 1009 (noting that some arbitration agreements require, however,
that the case first be submitted to the host’s local courts, but that if the case is not
resolved after 18 months then the investor has recourse in international arbitration).
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state beneficiaries directly enforceable rights at the international
level. The investment regime is enforced by the thousands of foreign
investors, principally multinational enterprises with the wherewithal
to invest overseas and to protect their financial interests when these
are threatened through international arbitration. Foreign investors
themselves serve as the private attorneys general to enforce and
enable ongoing interpretation of international investment law. 52 The
growing body of arbitral international investment case law is
therefore as much their creation as it is of the states that enter into
investment treaties.
The United States exerted considerable leadership in the creation
of this international investment regime. 53 While the United States
was not the first Western country to establish bilateral investment
treaties (“BITs”), its first BITs were among the most investorprotective ever devised, as was the investment chapter of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”). 54 The investor-state
claims brought pursuant to the NAFTA by North American law firms
have encouraged foreign investors around the world to seek recourse
through International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(“ICSID”) arbitration and have helped to spur the growing
movement to investor-state arbitration under other mechanisms, such
as ICSID’s Additional Facility and the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”). 55 The United States,
the country that has been for a considerable period of time the home
to the leading foreign investors of the world, has led in establishing
the contemporary international investment regime. The United States
also has been highly influential with respect to many other actions by
international organizations that complement the investment regime,
such as efforts by the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), the
World Bank, and regional development banks to impose “good

52. See LOWENFELD, supra note 48, at 485, 493 (explaining the important
contribution investors play in arbitration and dispute resolution which contributes
to the corpus of international law).
53. See generally KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT
TREATIES: POLICY AND PRACTICE 20-1 (1992).
54. See generally, José E. Alvarez, Critical Theory and the North American
Free Trade Agreement’s Chapter Eleven, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 303
(1996-97).
55. See, e.g., Sachs & Sauvant, supra note 49, at xxxviii-xli.
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governance” standards on states that complement the rights granted
foreign investors in investment agreements. 56

III. COUNTER-NARRATIVE: LAW OF EMPIRE
Not all international lawyers have accepted the binary description
of law/non-law, unilateral/multilateral actions discussed earlier.
Others, especially those who consider themselves members of
critical legal studies movements, argue that these regimes merely
legalize rule by the powerful, and especially by the United States and
its closest Western allies. “Crits,” especially those who consider
themselves part of the Third World Approaches to International Law
(“TWAIL”) academic genre, argue that the legal regimes discussed
infra constitute contemporary forms of neocolonialism. 57 For current
critics of international law—such as Makua Matua, Ugo Mattei, or
B.S. Chimni—these U.S.-backed international law regimes do not
represent the neutral law among sovereign equals favored by
international idealists, but law imposed by and at the service of the
world’s hegemon or hegemons. 58 Orders by the Security Council, the
dictates of the IMF, or the rules of investment treaties are, from the
critical perspective, nothing more than U.S. imperial ambitions
“laundered” by law—whether “blue-washed” through the (mis)use of
the United Nations or international financial institutions or imposed
on the unwilling through unequal bilateral treaties. 59 American
University’s Washington College of Law has helped to popularize
56. See generally Daniel Kalderimis, IMF Confidentiality as Investment
Regulation: A Theoretical Analysis, 13 SOC. & LEG. STUD. 103 (2004); David P.
Fidler, A Kinder, Gentler System of Capitulations? International Law, Structural
Adjustment Policies, and the Standard of Liberal, Globalized Civilization, 35 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 387 (2000).
57. See Obiora Chinedu Okafor, Newness, Imperialism, and International
Legal Reform in Our Time: A TWAIL Perspective, 43 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 171
(2005) (surveying TWAIL literature).
58. See, e.g., Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S.
Hegemony and the Latin Resistance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 383 (2003)
(describing the new forms of “imperial” international law dominated by a few
hegemonic players); B.S. Chimni, International Institutions Today: An Imperial
Global State in the Making, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (2004) (semble); Makau Mutua,
Critical Race Theory and International Law: The View of an Insider-Outsider, 45
VILL. L. REV. 841 (2000) (arguing that current international law is a reflection of
Eurocentric preoccupations).
59. See generally LLOYD GRUBER, RULING THE WORLD: POWER POLITICS AND
THE RISE OF SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (2000).
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the view that much of contemporary international law seeks to
implement the “Washington consensus” 60 on how all states are
supposed to behave—whether with respect to the threat of terrorism
or foreign investors. The Grotius lectures that the Washington
College of Law has generously sponsored in recent annual meetings
of the American Society of International Law have provocatively
raised the profile of such views. 61

A. THE SECURITY COUNCIL: LEGISLATING HEGEMONY
As my own work depicting recent Security Council actions as
manifestations of “hegemonic international law” suggests, 62 this rival
description of contemporary international law has considerable merit.
Although, as noted above, it is easy to portray the Council
resolutions surveyed above as examples of the U.N. Charter working
as intended, it is also easy to suggest the opposite. Security Council
resolutions like 1373 and 1540, which purport to bind all states
subject to no geographic or temporal limitation, can be seen as
constituting an unprecedented and unwarranted “legislative” or even
“constitutional” turn for an organ originally intended to serve only as
collective enforcer of the peace, not global lawmaker.63 By using its
political leverage on the Council, the United States has managed on
these occasions to circumvent the “vehicle par excellence of
community interest,” namely the negotiation of a multilateral treaty,
and has opted instead to use an unaccountable global law-maker
subject to its veto power. 64
Security Council law-making also has peculiar characteristics not
shared by much of international law. In Resolution 1373, for
example, the Council selected only some provisions of a recently

60. See John Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reforms, in
LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED? 7, 7-8 (John
Williamson ed., 1990) (including in the “Washington consensus” political
branches, international financial institutions, economic agencies, and think tanks).
61. See, e.g., B.S. Chimni, A Just World Under Law: A View from the South, 22
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 199 (2007) (The Eighth Annual Grotius Lecture presented at
the 100th annual meeting of the American Society of International Law).
62. Alvarez, supra note 20.
63. See generally Jena L. Cohen, A Global State of Emergency or the Further
Constitutionalization of International Law: A Pluralist Approach, 15
CONSTELLATIONS 456 (2008).
64. Alvarez, supra note 20, at 875 (quoting Bruno Simma).
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concluded (and therefore not widely ratified) Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, added provisions that do
not appear in that treaty (because they did not win favor at the
multilateral level), and omitted those provisions which it did not like,
including the Convention’s explicit deference to other requirements
of international law. These include the due process rights of persons
charged with terrorism-related offences, the rights of extradited
persons, and the treaty’s provisions envisioning judicial review. 65
Further, unlike most efforts to implement global rules within the
United Nations, the Council’s 1373 and 1540 regimes rely on groups
of experts not chosen on the basis of geographic representation but
dominated by experts from the United States and United Kingdom. 66
This effort at “imperial” law relies less on an “independent
international civil service” than do most efforts by international
organizations. And the fact that the Security Council’s efforts under
its resolution 1267, which imposes direct sanctions on individuals,
are no less respectful of due process rights than is U.S. national law
with respect to “enemy combatants” captured in the United States’
war on terror does not reflect positively on the Council. 67
These critiques are valuable insofar as they remind us that the turn
to multilateralism, or at least to those multilateral institutions
established after the second World War, is no guarantee that the ideal
of the rule of law will be satisfied. As Lloyd Gruber reminds us, the
IMF’s harsh conditionality policies are no less unfair or inequitable
merely because they come from a multilateral institution. 68

B. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
It is even easier to brand the international investment regime,
largely built on BITs, as tools of empire. BITs are comparable to the
capitulation agreements that Western powers once extracted from the
periphery in the nineteenth century. 69 Under such agreements,
65. Id. at 876.
66. See id. (noting that other members do not have the power and resources to
object to the U.S. and U.K. dominance).
67. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05 P, Kadi v. Council, 2008 E.C.R. 00
(critically examining the legality of European legislation implementing the
Security Council’s counterterrorism sanctions).
68. See GRUBER, supra note 59, at 55 (noting government leaders’ attempts to
blame the IMF for hardships imposed under IMF conditionality).
69. See generally Fidler, supra note 56.
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Western colonial powers gained extraterritorial jurisdiction in the
territories of non-Western countries by exempting Western nationals
(including Western merchants and investors) from local law. These
capitulation agreements imposed the “standard of civilization” on the
“uncivilized” by granting jurisdiction over Western nationals and
their property to consular officials of the Western states in lieu of
local courts. 70 Western states justified these treaties on the premise
that poor host states of foreign traders and investors were incapable
of satisfying the standard of justice granted by “civilized nations.” 71
Like old capitulation agreements, present day BITs also exempt
foreign investors from having to go to local courts. They merely
substitute international arbitral mechanisms for the former’s recourse
to consular officials. Further, while investment agreements are
formally the product of mutual state consent, the consent by LDCs to
terms that are extremely favorable to foreign investors largely from
the West has been heavily constrained by the dictates of the market
as well as the privatization and other demands extracted by
institutions like the World Bank and the IMF. 72

IV. THE COMPLEXITY OF CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES
This alternative critical description of international legal regimes,
however, is something of a caricature despite its merits. Efforts to
characterize contemporary legal regimes in the Security Council or
under BITs as manifestations of either the ideal of law or the “law of
empire” are unduly simplistic. Closer attention to the actual
operation of such regimes reveals that these regimes are subject to
counter-veiling forces that make them both hegemonic and lawful.
They are more accurately seen not as the law of empire but as
empires of law.

70. See id. at 391-92.
71. See id. at 392.
72. Cf. id. at 404 (explaining that while international law is still an exercise in
hegemonic power, the global economic and political fallout from the Cold War
enabled policy and legal reform in developing countries by the IMF and World
Bank).
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A. THE BACKLASH AGAINST THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Consider what has happened even in the brief time since 9/11
under the Security Council regimes surveyed above. The United
States’ resort to the Security Council to legitimate its use of force in
the wake of 9/11 resulted in consequences for the United States, as
well as for others and for the resulting law. The U.S. officials who
opted to turn to the Council had not anticipated all of these
consequences. While the Security Council’s acquiescence in military
action in Afghanistan has gone some way towards modifying the
underlying rules governing self defense, the law has not moved
towards accepting the preemptive use of force. As Ian Hurd has
argued, the justificatory legal discourse required of any state going to
the Council initially forced the United States to try to justify its
invasion of Iraq by asserting the existence of weapons of mass
destruction. The subsequent absence of such weapons imposed a
substantial cost on the United States in terms of lost allies. 73 The
Council’s failure to approve the U.S. invasion has arguably held the
line on the United States’ most far-reaching attempts to deviate from
the traditional rules governing the use of force. Similarly, the United
States’ recourse to the Council to justify its occupation has imposed
constraints on U.S. actions, among them, the fact that a continued
U.S. presence in Iraq remains contingent on Iraqi acquiescence and
subsequent approval by the Security Council. 74
Considerable push-back by states and NGOs objecting to
“legislative” efforts by the Council has also accompanied the
Council’s efforts on counterterrorism and weapons of mass
destruction. 75 As Ian Johnstone and others have noted, supporters of

73. IAN HURD, AFTER ANARCHY: LEGITIMACY AND POWER IN THE UNITED
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (2007); see also Ian Hurd, The Strategic Use of
Liberal Internationalism: Libya and the U.N. Sanctions, 1992-2003, 59 INT’L ORG.
501 (2005) (explaining how legitimacy may be lost if the hegemon is too often
seen as itself violating the rules of the game).
74. See, e.g., Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder: U.S. Security
Agreements and Iraq, Dec. 23, 2008 (examining the agreements that have
determined the legality of the continued U.S. presence in Iraq as supervised by the
Security Council), available at http://www.cf.org/publication/16448/.
75. See, e.g., Monitoring Group Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 1363 (2001) and Extended by Resolution 1390 (2002), Second Report
of the Monitoring Group Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
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resolution 1373 over time have had to devote much greater efforts to
securing implementation with counter-terrorism measures through
deliberative discourse less reliant on top-down Council fiat. 76 There
have been greater efforts to justify the merits of the underlying
measures, greater efforts to make the operation of relevant Council
committees more transparent, and a shift to more accountable forms
of implementation. 77 In 2005, for example, the CTC was made
subject to the direction of a larger body, the Counter-terrorism
Directorate (“CTED”). 78 Although U.S. officials sought to have the
CTED report solely to the CTC, resistance by other states led to a
compromise whereby the U.N. Secretary-General would appoint its
executive director. 79 Suggestions that the goal of resolution 1373 was
to secure global dissemination of the USA PATRIOT Act have been
quietly shelved amidst growing agreement that the best way to secure
effective counter-terrorism cooperation involves persuading, not
forcing, states to comply. In addition, there has been a more serious
complementary effort within the General Assembly to come up with
a multilateral convention which, unlike the Council’s more
hegemonic efforts, actually defines what “terrorism” is. 80 Even the
United States deems this necessary to stem the opportunism that
counterterrorism Security Council ‘legislation’ without benefit of
definition engenders. 81

1363 (2001) and Extended by Resolution 1390 (2002), U.N. Doc. S/2002/1050
(Sept. 20, 2002) (noting that some states have failed to take measure because of the
lack of legislative authority to do so); Per Cramér, Recent Swedish Experience with
Targeted U.N. Sanctions: The Erosion of Trust in the Security Council, in REVIEW
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBER STATES 85, 105 (Erika de Wet et al. eds.,
2003) (examining the difficulties Sweden encountered in implementing Security
Council issued sanctions that were in apparent contradiction of individuals’
fundamental rights).
76. See Ian Johnstone, Legislation and Adjudication in the U.N. Security
Council: Bringing Down the Deliberative Deficit, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 275, 276
(2008) (contending that public policy decisions are best made when accompanied
by reasoned argumentation).
77. Id. at 288-89.
78. See id. at 285 (noting that the CTED comprised 20 experts in charge of
helping the CTC make policy and strategic decisions).
79. Id.
80. See id. at 288-89; ERIC ROSAND, ALISTAIR MILLAR & JASON IPE, THE UN
SECURITY COUNCIL’S COUNTERTERRORISM PROGRAM: WHAT LIES AHEAD? (Oct.
2007).
81. Cf. Human Rights Watch, Current Events, Opportunism in the Face of
Tragedy: Repression in the Name of Anti-Terrorism, http://www.hrw.org/legacy/
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There has been even greater member push-back with respect to the
smart counterterrorism sanctions imposed under 1267 and
subsequent resolutions. Members quickly objected to how this
regime operated and challenges soon emerged in national courts, the
European Court of Human Rights, and the European Court of
Justice. 82 Political pressures from states objecting to the listing of
their nationals have forced changes in the way the Sanctions
Committee operates. While initially individuals were listed (largely
at the behest of intelligence experts from the United States and the
United Kingdom) based on political trust, there were no procedures
for removing persons from the sanctions list once listed and there
were no exceptions identified for enabling targeted individuals to
have access to some money to meet their daily needs for shelter and
food. The U.N. sanctions committee was forced to change its
procedures. 83 Under European pressure, that committee was
compelled to identify formal guidelines or evidentiary standards for
states to follow in proposing names, and to incorporate humanitarian
exceptions and a de-listing procedure. 84
But these positive steps to enhance the counterterrorism regime’s
transparency and legitimacy were insufficient to prevent the
culmination of challenges before international dispute settlers. After
a number of predictable judicial determinations in both national
courts and the European Court of Human Rights that binding Council
actions could not be judicially reviewed or challenged, in 2008 a
grand chamber of the European Court of Justice finally held in Kadi
v. Council of the European Union that the council’s targeted
sanctions as implemented under European community law could not
be sustained. 85 The Court refused to find that it was unable to engage
in judicial review of the legality of the sanctions as applied to
individuals living within the European Union and refused to find that
campaigns/september11/opportunismwatch.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2009);
William Orme, Response to Terror: U.N. Fears Abuses of Terror Mandate, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 2, 2002, at A1 (presenting examples of governments restricting
freedoms under the pretense of fighting terrorism).
82. See, e.g., Kadi v. Council, supra note 67; Bosphorus v. Ireland, 2005-VI
Eur. Ct. H.R. 109; Case T-253/02, Ayadi v. Council, 2006 E.C.R. II-2139; Case T306/01, Yusuf v. Council, 2005 E.C.R. II-3533.
83. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1730, ¶¶ 1-7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1730 (Dec. 19, 2006)
(outlining the new de-listing procedure).
84. Id.
85. Kadi, 2008 E.C.R. at ¶ 61.
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the primacy of Security Council actions could prevent an inquiry into
whether the underlying sanctions were consistent with the
fundamental rights granted to individuals under European law. 86 The
court went on to find the de-listing procedures provided by the U.N.
Security Council fell short of respecting the rights of European
nationals to assert their own rights during a relevant proceeding
because the de-listing procedures were only “diplomatic and
intergovernmental.” The Court noted that the procedures also failed
to provide access to the reasons and evidence justifying one’s
appearance on the list of sanctioned individuals, and therefore
prevented the opportunity for that individual to present a defense and
receive an effective legal remedy. 87 Despite the fact that the U.N.
sanctions were stated to be “temporary,” the Court found that the
European regulation implementing them was a disproportionate and
intolerable interference with the individual’s property right under
European law and the European Convention on Human Rights. 88
Accordingly, the Court annulled the regulation as applied to the
applicants before it but permitted it to be maintained for three
months to allow the European Council to remedy the flaws that it
found with respect to procedures. 89
Whatever is the final outcome of that particular case, the question
of how to adjust the U.N. Security Council’s counterterrorism
sanctions regime to make it more compatible with international
human rights is an issue that both the European Council and the U.N.
Security Council will eventually need to resolve. Otherwise the
legitimacy and possibly the legality of the counterterrorism sanctions
regime of the United Nations will continue to be in doubt.
These examples suggest how contemporary international law sets
limits when powerful states try to use the rule of law or multilateral
institutions, even in institutions in which the powerful states hold a
veto, to advance the law of empire. The Security Council’s efforts
are not quite the same as actions taken by the United States on its
own. Even the Council must comport its legislative actions with the
expectations of the international community and with the rest of
international law. As the Kadi decision suggests, these limits arise
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. ¶¶ 283-299.
Id. ¶¶ 323-326.
Id. ¶¶ 369-371.
Id. ¶¶ 372-376.
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because the U.N. Security Council’s actions now exist within an
inescapable larger web of international law and institutions,
including a myriad of international courts.

B. CONSTRAINT OF EMPIRE IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
But as the example of the international investment regime
addressed infra suggests, the law of empire is necessarily constrained
as well even when multilateral institutions are not as involved in
their elaboration or enforcement. In other cases, constraints reemerge to the extent that law—even hegemonic law—remains
grounded in reciprocal application.
The contention that the international investment regime is
comparable to nineteenth century capitulation agreements ignores the
fact that today’s flows of investment are not merely in one direction,
from north to south. At the moment, the United States is both the
world’s leading exporter of capital flows and its leading recipient of
foreign investment capital. 90 We share this duality with others, such
as Brazil, Russia, India and China (abbreviated to “BRICs”), all of
which are also leading recipients and exporters of capital. 91 Of the
net stock of foreign direct investment capital, approximately
seventeen percent of it consists of outward FDI flows from emerging
markets. 92 It is no longer accurate to portray the international legal
regime governing foreign regime as strictly concerned with
protecting capital from the West as it goes to the rest.
What this means is that the United States has developed,
particularly over recent years, the same love-hate relationship when
it comes to foreign investment as have many other countries. The
United States, along with virtually all countries (including
communist holdovers such as Cuba) are now firm converts to David
Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage. 93 This is clearly
90. See ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE UNIT, WORLD INVESTMENT PROSPECTS TO
2011: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF POLITICAL RISK
(2007), available at http://vcc.columbia.edu/pubs/documents/WorldInvestment
Prospectsto2011.pdf.
91. See Sachs & Sauvant, supra note 49, at xxxii.
92. Id.
93. DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION
(Everyman’s Library No. 590, Ernest Rhys ed., 1911). See generally Alan O.
Sykes, Comparative Advantage and the Normative Economics of International
Trade Policy, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 49 (1998) (providing an introduction to and
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evidenced by the fact that over the course of recent years, nearly all
countries around the world have modified their national laws to make
it easier for foreign investors to enter and operate in their
territories. 94 Virtually all nations now regard free capital flows as
indispensable for economic growth. At the same time, the United
States shares fears with most countries, including LDCs, about
whether granting reciprocal rights to all investors will interfere with
sovereign prerogatives or result in challenges to national law. 95
Foreign takeovers of U.S. companies, including former public
utilities, remain a flash point of debate over the power of sovereigns
to influence employment, control national security, preserve local
jobs and prevent outsourcing, encourage technological innovation,
and protect intellectual property or national security. 96
Comparing provisions of the 1984 Model U.S. BIT with the
provisions that appear in the latest U.S. Model text suggests what the
United States’ twenty years of experience with investment treaties,
including over ten as a defendant under NAFTA in cases brought by
Canadian investors in the United States challenging U.S. federal and
state laws under the vague open ended guarantees under the 1984
treaty, has wrought. 97 Over time, the U.S. government has become
more reticent about protecting the rights of foreign investors at the
expense of the sovereign prerogatives of the United States. Today’s
U.S. Model BIT is more than twice as long as it once was. 98 It has
become a longer document in order to better protect the sovereign or
regulatory rights that the United States once ridiculed when it was
fighting the proposed “New International Economic Order” once
advocated by LDCs. 99 The text of its most recent Model BIT reflects

overview of comparative advantage).
94. Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note 90, at 67 (noting that out of 2,394
changes in national FDI laws between 1991 and 2005, 92% were in the direction of
creating a more favorable climate for foreign investors).
95. Cf. id. at 11, 12-13 (arguing that a rise in protectionism among states is
hampering foreign direct investment, namely mergers and acquisitions).
96. See Sachs & Sauvant, supra note 49, at tbd.
97. For a table comparing the respective texts of the U.S. Model BITs of 1984
and 2004, see José E. Alvarez, The Evolving BIT (forthcoming Transnational
Dispute Management 2009).
98. For the text of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, see http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_
Sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/Section_Index.html.
99. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), pmbl., ¶ 3, art. 18, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(Dec. 12, 1974) (promoting an economic order “based on equity, sovereign
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a U.S. government that has faced investor claims under the NAFTA
challenging California’s rights to protect its ground water as a
violation of the overly broad guarantees of fair and equitable
treatment 100 and asserting that a Mississippi jury award of punitive
damages against a Canadian investor constituted an illegal taking of
property. 101 The newly hedged BIT language also reflects awareness
of ICSID decisions interpreting the U.S.-Argentina BIT that have
found Argentina liable for millions of dollars in damages resulting
from harms inflicted on foreign investors as a result of general
measures that Argentina took in response to a serious economic and
political crisis. 102
The new language of U.S. BITs recalibrates the balance between
the rights accorded investors and a nation’s right to regulate in the
public interest in a number of ways. Under the new Model BIT, the
United States has restricted the definition of the fair and equitable
guarantee, suggesting that it only embraces traditional protections
103
under customary international law. While that guarantee still
covers incidents of maltreatment by national courts, it limits investor
protections to egregious acts involving basic violations of due
process. 104 The new U.S. language on expropriation restricts the
meaning of “indirect” takings to violations that would be recognized
by the U.S. Supreme Court in the classic takings case, Penn
Central. 105 Takings jurisprudence should recognize the elements
equality, interdependence, common interest and co-operation among all States,
irrespective of their economic and social systems”).
100. Methanex Corp. v. U.S., (Can. v. U.S.), pt. II, ch. D, 8-9, 44 I.L.M. 1345
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2005), available at http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/
USA/Methanex/Methanex_Final_Award.pdf (finding that the court had no
jurisdiction over a suit by Methanex against the United States alleging violation of
NAFTA’s Chapter 11).
101. The Loewen Group, Inc. et al. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3,
¶¶92-95, 42 I.L.M. 811 (2003) (rejecting a NAFTA chapter 11 action alleging
violation by the United States after an allegedly unfair trial).
102. See generally José E. Alvarez, and Kathryn Khamsi, The Argentine Crisis
and Foreign Investors: A Glimpse into the Heart of the Investment Regime, Yrbk
International Investment Law & Policy 379 (2008-09).
103. See U.S. Model BIT of 2004, supra note 98, at Art. 5 and annex A.
104. See, e.g., Treaty Between the United States of America and the Oriental
Republic of Uruguay Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment, U.S.-Uru., art. 5, ¶¶ 1-3, annex A, Apr. 4, 2006, S. Treaty Doc. No.
109-9 [hereinafter U.S.-Uruguay Treaty].
105. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., et al. v. New York City, et al., 438 U.S. 104
(1978), U.S-Uruguay Treaty, supra note 104, annex B (using the analysis of
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contained in annex B(4) in the U.S.-Uruguay BIT as the balancing
factors identified by the U.S. Supreme Court in that Penn Central. 106
Moreover, the new U.S. language with respect to the measures that
“it considers necessary” for the protection of its essential security
suggests an attempt to make that clause essentially self-judging.
Thus, international arbitrators cannot second-guess a state’s
determination that a measure that harms a foreign investor is needed
to protect that state’s own determination of the state’s “essential
security.” 107 The changes that the U.S. has made to its investment
treaty bring the property protections granted in those agreements
closer to the way property rights are recognized and protected in the
European Convention on Human Rights. 108
The changes to the U.S. BIT program over the course of twenty
years demonstrate that the investment regime can no longer be
caricatured as law designed only to protect the capital interests of the
metropole. They show that today’s investment agreements, or at least
those concluded by the erstwhile leader of the investment regime, are
not quite like colonial era capitulation treaties. Today’s BITs bite the
metropole back. As the U.S. changes to its most recent BITs suggest,
the metropole is occasionally chafing under the regime’s reciprocal
constraints. And yet the fact that both rich states like the United
States and LDCs continue to accept the general premises of the
investment regime and ticker only around the edges of its investor
protections suggests the extent to which states still consider that

takings found in the Supreme Court’s decision of Penn Central, to limit the
definition of indirect expropriation).
106. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124.
107. See U.S.-Uruguay Treaty, supra note 104, art. 18, ¶ 2 (“Nothing in this
treaty shall be construed . . . to preclude a Party from applying measures that it
considers necessary for the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the
maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of
its own essential security interests.”). For consideration of the significance of this
change, see generally Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 102.
108. See Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 (“Every natural or
legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall
be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided by law and by the general principles of international law. The
preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in
accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”).
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regime to be in their interests. States’ continued reliance on
international investment treaties indicates the degree to which all
states have now bought into the premise that liberal capital flows
provide mutual benefit. Most states do not see their investment
agreements as a zero-sum game like a capitulation agreement. Most
states continue to believe that the mutual flow of capital raises all
boats. Today, when 27 percent of the BITs are between developing
countries 109 and a considerable portion of capital flows are going to
the West as well as coming from the East, it is less plausible to
describe investment agreements as one-sided tools of the West. Nor
are the countries such as China and Egypt who are signing such
agreements to protect their foreign investors easily characterized as
agents of Anglo-American empire. 110 Today’s global regime for
investment is not simply a product of treaties imposed through
bilateral assertions of power by the rich West against the rest.

V. A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH TO
UNDERSTANDING “EMPIRE”
Describing the essence of complex regimes, whether they are led
by the U.N. Security Council or formed by bilateral investment
treaties, is a challenge. We need a description that recognizes that
what we now have is different from prior empires that were
territorially based or were essentially the product of one state’s
power writ large. While these regimes remain tools of empire, we
need to recognize that the meaning of “empire” is now distinct from
what it was in the colonial age. These contemporary legal regimes
exist in a realm beyond statehood, a place where the categories of
imperialized periphery and exploitative metropole blur.

109. See Sachs & Sauvant, supra note 49, at xxxiv.
110. See id. fig. 8, at xxv (indicating that China (119 BITs) and Egypt (100) are
among the ten countries with the largest number of BITs as of June 2007; the
United States is not among the top ten BIT signatories). Cf. WALTER RUSSELL
MEAD, GOD AND GOLD: BRITAIN, AMERICA, AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN
WORLD (2007) (describing how the English speaking powers have shaped the
modern world).
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A. ANCIENT EMPIRE
In ancient usage, an imperium was universal by definition. 111
Ancient empires saw themselves as all-encompassing. An empire
was a harmonious and autonomous cosmos confronted otherwise
only by chaos. 112 Those who stayed outside its domain were
uncivilized savages. In ancient times, true “empires” aspired to
universality.
The Athenian Empire which began roughly in 478 BC and
collapsed in 405 B.C. is particularly interesting. That empire
emerged from an alliance among Hellenic states against the
Persians. 113 In 454 B.C. Athens reorganized the alliance, the Delian
League, and established a joint treasury at Delos which collected
contributions from the allies. 114 Under Athenian leadership, the
independent states sent representatives to a temple at Delos where
decisions were taken in a general congress. The Delian League came
to include captured cities (whose populations were enslaved and the
land colonized by Athenians) and members of the League who had
once rebelled and were compelled back into it and forced to give
tribute. As Michael Doyle has described it, “the Delian League thus
became an empire in which Athens exercised imperial control largely
by informal means.” 115
This regime was sustained by “allies of the tribute-paying class,”
each of which had a “.legally independent, formally sovereign
government, including a democratic assembly.” 116 The Delian
League was also sustained by periodic military interventions and by
the voluntary acquiescence of the populations and elites of the
periphery—who sometimes feared, hated, or revered Athens but
which were generally aware that integration into the League
conferred concrete economic benefits, including access to the

111. STEPHEN HOWE, EMPIRE: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 13-14 (2002)
(explaining that imperium, the predecessor of the word “empire,” meant rule over
wide territories to which no other monarch could claim title).
112. Id. at 14 (asserting that the Greeks created, and the Romans espoused, the
idea that groups outside the empire were barbarians).
113. MICHAEL W. DOYLE, EMPIRES 54-81 (1986).
114. Id. at 55.
115. Id. at 56.
116. Id.
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Athenian market, the protection of Athens from piracy, and other
imperially provided “collective goods.” 117 Unlike Sparta’s
hegemonic alliance, the Peloponnesian League (which only
controlled the foreign relations of its allies), Athens was more
ambitious. It collected tribute, imposed the jurisdiction of its courts,
regulated the commerce of its subject allies, and sought to impose a
“democratic” form of government over indigenous traditions of
government. 118 As Doyle tells the story, the brief Athenian empire
was driven by concerns for security, material self interest (including
the need to maintain open sea lanes and trade), and self-confidence in
spreading the Athenian way of life. 119

B. THE MODERN EMPIRE OF LAW
There are obvious parallels between the Athenian League, today’s
United States, and today’s regimes for collective security and the
regulation of foreign investment. The Athenian example suggests
that empire can be built by a “adventurous” 120 and proud democratic
society intent on spreading its democratic way of life to others; that
empire can be grounded on conceptions of the market, private
property, liberalized free trade among what we would today call
nation states, and it that can spread through the rule of law applied
extraterritorially. But it also suggests that an empire built on trade
can still have an impact on the periphery’s foreign and domestic
affairs. At the same time, as the previous discussion of the U.N.
Security Council and investment regimes demonstrate, it is not
entirely right to describe these regimes as mere passive conduits for
imposing U.S. views on others. Such an interpretation fails to
acknowledge a principal source of the legitimacy and power of these
regimes.
As the example of ancient empires illustrates, some “empires” can
be based on universalistic ideals, including universal rules of law.
The Delian League example demonstrates that there can be such a
thing as an “empire of legal rules” that is distinguishable from or at

117. Id. at 56-57.
118. Id. at 59.
119. Id. at 61-63.
120. Id. at 65 (defining the adventurous spirit of Athens as “an attitude of mind
and a repertory of actions which together create a distinctive way of life”).
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least not identical to rule by imperialist territorial colonial empire. 121
Modern regimes for counter-terrorism and for the regulation of
investment, like much else in contemporary international law, share a
number of characteristics with Athenian empire. Today’s legalistic
methods enable the exercise of indirect hegemonic power. Powerful
states such as the United States can still get their way but may
sometimes achieve their goals through the legitimation processes
provided by multilateral institutions or through recourse to the
“traditional” pedigreed sources of international law, such as treaties.
Still, the effects of indirect empire can be, like those of Athens,
pervasive. Possibly because their hegemonic impact is indirect,
today’s international legal regimes can penetrate more deeply into
the foreign and domestic policies of states than could the direct topdown rules of colonial empire, which were more likely to generate
resentment and resistance. The contemporary Security Council and
investment regimes, like the Athenian empire, rely on common
interests genuinely shared among states. Their legitimacy and
efficacy largely depend on voluntary acquiescence, even if the U.N.
counterterrorism regime relies, as did Athens, on the threat of
military intervention.
Today, most states, like the United States, want to deter terrorists
and their access to WMDs. Most also want incoming foreign
investment and want to protect their own investors going abroad,
because many states, and not only the United States, have within
them the modern equivalent of a “tribute-paying” class, namely
entrepreneurs who benefit from the investment regime. The desire
most states have for foreign capital is, in short, not merely one that is
dictated by international bureaucrats at the IMF. At the same time, as
the changes to the U.S. Model BIT suggest, states still want to
protect their sovereign rights to regulate in the public interest, while
still protecting the rights of foreign investors.
There are potential connections between the modern international
regimes described here, democratic self-governance and inter-state
security; indeed, these connections existed in ancient Athens. As

121. Cf. Note, Aspiration and Control: International Legal Rhetoric and the
Essentialization of Culture, 106 HARV. L. REV. 723, 738 (1993) (“. . . the idea of
international law as an ordering mechanism that draws its categories from an
essential culture and yet stands apart from its cultural context continues to
command considerable rhetorical power.”).
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with the Athenian League, the investment regime highlights the
importance and protection of private entrepreneurs; like that ancient
League, it relies on foreign trade for both security and commerce.
Like it, the investment regime also reproduces an international
division of labor. To some the investment regime, along with the
WTO’s trade regime, is an essential component of the “liberal”
peace. 122 The Security Council’s counter-terrorism regime is also
premised on the need to protect globalization from threats posed by
non-state actors intent on destroying or disrupting not only global
commerce but democratic institutions. 123
The global regimes for counter-terrorism and international
investment resemble ancient empires in a more fundamental way.
These regimes also aspire to universality. They also rely on
sacrosanct truths that in our secular age approach the divine
revelation that justified some ancient empires. 124 In lieu of universal
agreement on a single god or set of gods, we have placed our
collective faith in the power of the United Nations’ collective
security scheme and, with respect to investment, in David Ricardo’s
theory of comparative advantage. 125 Participation and compliance
with these regimes are, increasingly, the only options states have.
Neither the United Nations’ collective security scheme nor the
investment regime has a clear rival. Those few states outside their
122. See, e.g., THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 239
(2000) (suggesting that no two countries with a McDonald’s franchise have gone
to war).
123. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1624, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624 (Sept. 14, 2005)
(“Deeply concerned that incitement of terrorist acts motivated by extremism and
intolerance poses a serious and growing danger to the enjoyment of human rights,
threatens the social and economic development of all States, undermines global
stability and prosperity, and must be addressed urgently and proactively by the
United Nations and all States, and emphasizing the need to take all necessary and
appropriate measures in accordance with international law at the national and
international level to protect the right to life . . . .”).
124. Cf. MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE 160-82 (2000)
(maintaining that U.S. empire is motivated by “the extension of the internal U.S.
constitutional project” and the promotion of independence and democracy);
DOYLE, supra note 114, at 62-63 (including among the Athenian empire’s
motivations for expansion a desire to spread its democracy and “way of life”).
125. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (introducing Ricardo’s theory of
comparative advantage). Cf. United Nations Member States, List of Member
States, http://www.un.org/members/list.shtml (last visited Mar. 3, 2009) (listing the
196 countries that have ratified the U.N. Charter and are members of the United
Nations).
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domain, like those outside the Athenian empire, may as well be
barbarians. Not participating in these regimes is tantamount to
political or financial suicide. 126 To be brought under the these
regimes—to be allowed to participate in them—is to be allowed to
enjoy the newly defined forms of “sovereignty” left to nation states,
as it was with Athens. 127 For much of the world, these regimes
(irrespective of their origins) are perceived as requirements of
contemporary civilization, morally and politically justified.

CONCLUSION
The empires of law described here are perhaps only an application
of Martti Koskenneimi’s insight that international law oscillates
between utopia and state apology. 128 But the empires of law
described here are probably closest to the universalist empire based
on the globalization of economic and cultural exchanges described
by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in their book, Empire. 129 Theirs
is a conception of empire premised on a “global market and global
circuits of production;” a new “global order, a new logic and
structure of rule—in short a new form of sovereignty.” 130 “Empire,”
they write, “is the political subject that effectively regulates these
global exchanges, the sovereign power that governs the world.” 131
Hardt and Negri write of a post-sovereign world that “encompasses
the spatial totality” and knows no territorial boundaries. 132 Their
version of empire joins societies across spatial political boundaries
and makes such boundaries less relevant.
126. Cf. FRIEDMAN, supra note 122, at 248 (observing that states that have the
resources or ideology to except themselves from globalization, such as North
Korea, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Iran, are the exception).
127. See generally ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 27
(1995) (defining contemporary sovereignty as “status,” including the ability to
participate in international institutions).
128. See generally MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (1989).
129. See HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 124, at xiv-xv (arguing that “the rule of
Empire operates on all registers of the social order extending down to the depths of
the social world”); see also Susan Marks, Empire’s Law, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 449, 461 (2003) (asserting that globalization reconfigures political authority
to create a new system of sovereignty).
130. HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 124, at xi.
131. Id.
132. Id. at xiv.
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As Hardt and Negri indicate, empires of law reflect the fact that
old notions of sovereignty and the exercise of sovereign power are
no longer sufficient to describe contemporary international law. 133
These regimes have outgrown their origins. They are no longer the
product of territorially demarcated empire—even as they enable the
pursuit of the ideologies favored by the powerful. 134 Nor are these
regimes mere fig leafs for old-fashioned imperialist power. Even the
United States is discovering that the shift to using legal tools and
institutions has consequences. Some of these include unanticipated
checks and balances on the exercise of hegemonic power, such as the
international courts that are proliferating to check the power of the
U.N. Security Council. 135 Others, such as the new forms of
“balancing” emerging within BITs, result from the fact that any law
worthy of the name needs to be reciprocally applied. Whether the
new empires of law of today will prove to be as short-lived as the
Athenian empire remains to be seen.

133. Id. at xii (arguing that empire is not an extension of imperialism which
worked to enrich European colonizers, but a decentralizing and deterritorializing
force). Cf. Marks, supra note 129, at 461 (asserting that globalization creates a new
form of sovereignty).
134. See Marks, supra note 129, at 461-64 (drawing comparisons between
international lawyers’ perspectives and those by Hardt and Negri).
135. For a chart of international courts and tribunals, see JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 404-05 (2005).

